This article explores the Ulster Volunteer Force's (UVF) decision in May 2007 to aban- don its campaign of ‰ÛÏarmed resistance- and pursue ‰ÛÏa non-military, civilianized, role- in Northern Ireland. It does so by analyzing the UVF's actions in light of the academic literature on strategic terrorism. The central argument advanced in the article is that theUVF's decision to put its weapons ‰ÛÏbeyond reach- and re-structure its organization along civilian lines is (a) internally consistent with its stated policy of countering ‰ÛÏvi- olent nationalism,- (b) symptomatic of the transformation in the sociopolitical context since the 1994 paramilitary cease-fires, and (c) the logical outworking of the group's lack of popular legitimacy among its core Protestant working-class support-base. The article concludes with an assessment of the risks and possible dividends that the end of UVF terrorism holds for the Northern Ireland peace process.