Does development aid attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in$\backslash$npost-conflict countries? This article contributes to the growing$\backslash$nliterature on effects of aid and on determinants of FDI by explaining$\backslash$nhow development aid in low-information environments is a signal that can$\backslash$nattract investment. Before investing abroad, firms seek data on$\backslash$npotential host countries. In post-conflict countries, reliable$\backslash$ninformation is poor, in part because governments face unusual incentives$\backslash$nto misrepresent information. In these conditions, firms look to signals.$\backslash$nOne is development aid, because donors tend to give more to countries$\backslash$nthey trust to properly handle the funds. Our results show that aid seems$\backslash$nto draw FDIhowever, this is conditional on whether the aid can be$\backslash$nconsidered geostrategically motivated. We also show that this effect$\backslash$ndecreases as time elapses after the conflict. This suggests that aid's$\backslash$nsignaling effect is specific to low-information environments, and helps$\backslash$nrule out alternative causal mechanisms linking aid and FDI.