Although overt repression has been studied extensively (e.g., mass arrests), there have been no rigorous investigations of covert repressive action (CRA; e.g., electronic and physical surveillance). To better understand the latter behavior, the author uses newdata about U.S. domestic intelligence activity directed against a Black Nationalist organization in Detroit, Michigan, during the late 1960s and early 1970s (N= 3,136, by neighborhood-month). In line with existing research, evidence reveals that CRA responds to dissent, lagged repression, and the level of economic development within a neighborhood. Differing from existing literature, however, results also disclose thatCRAresponds to where dissidents live and, most important, in accordance to the racial characteristics of the neighborhood within which potential targets are located. Wiretaps and tails are thus prompted by numerous factors, but the identity of challengers (i.e., political äóìprofilingäó) proves to be an essential part of the explanation.